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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Judy Thompson ("Claimant"), is represented by Dennis R. 
Peterson of Idaho Falls, Idaho. Respondents-Defendants, Clear Springs Foods, 
Inc. ("Clear Springs" or "Employer") and Liberty Northwest Insurance Co. ("LNW" 
or "Surety"), are represented by E. Scott Harmon of Boise, Idaho. 
Hearing before the Industrial Commission ("Commission") was held on 
September 24, 2008 before Commission Referee Michael E. Powers on the 
bifurcated issue of whether injuries sustained by Claimant as a result of an 
alleged slip and fall accident on January 31, 2008 arose out of and in the course 
of Claimant's employment with Clear Springs. Following hearing, neither party 
undertook additional depositions. Claimant filed her Opening Brief and 
Defendants Responded. Claimant waived filing of a Reply Brief. Upon the 
record introduced at hearing and upon the briefing provided by the parties, 
Referee Powers issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendations on January 14, 2009. By Order of the following day, 
January 15, 2009, the Commission proper unanimously approved, confirmed 
and adopted Referee Powers' findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own. 
Referee Powers and the Commission both specifically found that, as a matter of 
fact, Claimant's alleged accident and injury had not arisen out of and in the 
course of her employment. 
Claimant did not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission 
and this appeal followed. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the date of hearing before the Commission, Claimant was 53 years old. 
Tr. 15: 19-21. She had worked in Employer's packaging department for 
approximately 12 years. Tr. 16: 1-6. 
On January 31, 2008, Claimant went to work at or about her normal 
10:00 a.m. start time. Tr. 16: 23-25, Ex. G, 145. As one might except for late 
January in the Magic Valley, there was snow on the ground from earlier flurries. 
Tr. 17: 16-19. Claimant parked her car in the employer-provided parking lot 
adjacent to the production facility. Tr. 17: 23- 18: 10; Ex. G, 146, 428. 
During her afternoon break, Claimant departed the employer's premises to 
move her vehicle from the employer-provided parking lot to a wide spot on a 
county road approximately 140 yards away. Tr. 27: 3-14; 51: 20-52: 2. Contrary to 
company policy, Claimant had neither sought permission of her supervisor before 
leaving Clear Springs premises nor had she clocked out. Ex. G, 145, 152; Tr. 43: 
5-12. Claimant was reprimanded for this violation of company policy. Ex. G, 147; 
Tr. 44: 4-8. 
While returning to her employer's place of business, but while still off her 
employer's premises, Claimant asserts she slipped and fell on the icy roadway, 
sustaining injury to her shoulder. Tr. 31: 19-23, 32: 21-33: 1; 53: 7-14.1 
1 The Referee had clear concerns regarding Claimant's purported fall and how a fall as Claimant 
describes, under these circumstances, could have occurred. Tr. 45: 12- 46: 8. Those questions 
are, though, beyond the very narrow scope of the bifurcated issue before the Commission and the 
even narrower issue now before this Court. 
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On returning to her employer's premises, Claimant notified her Lead, Kathy 
Henson, and Production Manager, Kris Henna, of the off premises slip and fall. 
Tr. 34: 18-19; 49: 13-21. 
Clear Springs has in place a procedure by which employees are allowed to 
travel through a nearby gated community to avoid the hill just outside the 
employer's parking lot when weather conditions so warrant. Tr. 54: 15-25. Such 
arrangements were not needed on January 31, 2008, the date of Claimant's 
asserted slip and fall. Tr. 73: 15-25. 
Claimant subsequently sought medical care for injuries sustained in the 
allegedly work related accident and injury. Def. Ex. D:10-14; Def. Ex. F:117-143; 
Def. Ex. H. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The sole issue before the Court is whether, upon the record developed at 
hearing, there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
Commission's factual determination that Claimant's alleged accident and 
resulting injury did not arise out of or in the course of her employment with Clear 
Springs. 
ARGUMENT 
A. RELEVANT LAW 
Relying upon the former Idaho Code §72-17(a) (now, §72-18(a)), this Court 
has established clear requirements for a Claimant seeking benefits under Idaho's 
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Worker's Compensation Law. In Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 
572, 574, 900 P.2d 738, 740 (1999), the Court recited: 
The applicable standard for determining whether an employee is 
entitled to compensation under the Worker's Compensation Act 
requires that the injury must have been caused by an accident 
"arising out of and in the course of employment." 
Claimant carries the burden of proving both that she was injured and that 
"the injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment." Seamans v. Maaco Auto Painting and Body Works, 128 Idaho 747, 
751, 918 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1996) (citing Neufeld v. Browning Farris Indus., 109 
Idaho 899,902, 712 P.2d 600, 603 (1985)). 
A worker receives an injury in the course of employment, if the 
worker is doing the duty that the worker is employed to perform. 
( citations omitted) This prong of the test, therefore, examines the 
time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred. 
Kessler ex rel. Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 859, 934 P.2d 28, 32 
(1997). 
An injury is considered to arise out of employment when a causal 
connection exists between the circumstances under which the work 
must be performed and the injury of which the claimant complains. 
( citations omitted) This prong of the compensability test examines 
the origin and cause of the accident. 
Id.at 860, 934 P.2d at 33. 
The standard of review long applied by this Court in an appeal such as 
this is similarly well and concisely set forth Kessler, supra: 
It is particularly important to note that whether an injury arose out 
of and in the course of employment is a question of fact to be 
decided by the Commission. Reinstein v. McGregor Land & 
Livestock Co., 126 Idaho 156,879 P.2d 1089 (1994). Although this 
Court may review the Commission's factual findings, this Court 
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must limit its review to determining whether the Commission 
correctly denied benefits after it applied the law to the relevant 
facts. Morgan v. Columbia Helicopters, Inc., 118 Idaho 347, 796 
P.2d 1020 (1990). This Court may not set aside findings of fact 
that are supported by substantial competent, although 
conflicting, evidence, see I.C. § 72-732(1 ); Gradwohl v. J.R. 
Simplot Co., 96 Idaho 655, 534 P.2d 775 (1975), but may disturb 
the Commission's findings, if they are clearly erroneous. Koester v. 
State Ins. Fund, 124 Idaho 205, 208, 858 P.2d 744, 747 (1993). 
This Court additionally may not scrutinize the weight and 
credibility of the evidence relied upon by the Commission but 
must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party who prevailed before the Commission. Darner v. 
Southeast Idaho In-Home Servs., 122 Idaho 897, 841 P.2d 427 
(1992). 
Kessler, 129 Idaho at 858, 934 P.2d at 31 (1997) (Emphasis added). 
This is not a case in which the credibility of any witness or any document 
is at issue and, hence, this Court's analysis of the distinction between 
"observational credibility" and "substantive credibility" and the impact of that 
distinction as set forth in Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 
P.3d 288 (2008) is not here implicated. 
The Commission's decision below turns solely upon an issue this Court 
has identified as a question of fact; whether Claimant's alleged injuries arose out 
of and in the course of her employment with Clear Springs. Hence, in 
accordance with Kessler, supra, the only determination the Court must here 
make is whether the Commission's findings were supported by substantial 
competent evidence. 
Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. It is more 
than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance. 
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Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 48, 156 P.3d 545, 549 (2007) (Internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
B. CONSTRUING EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO 
RESPONDENTS, THE COMMISSION'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION 
BELOW THAT CLAIMANT'S ACCIDENT AND INJURY DID NOT ARISE 
OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT IS BASED 
UPON SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE. 
This is not a complicated factual scenario; Claimant, solely to satisfy her 
personal desires and without regard to the requirements or business needs of 
her employer, departed her employer's premises without permission and without 
clocking out and undertook, upon her own, to face the risks inherent in traversing 
a hill on an icy country road, on foot, on the evening of January 31, 2008. Not 
unforeseeably, Claimant allegedly slipped on the slick incline and fell, suffering 
injury. The parallel between this case and the facts found in Freeman v. Twin 
Falls Clinic and Hosp., 135 Idaho 36, 13 P.3d 867 (2000) are striking. 
In Freeman, claimant chose to park her vehicle on the street rather than in 
the employer-provided parking lot. She had testified that a supervisor told her she 
could park on the street and that many smokers did so as it made it easier to run 
to the car for a cigarette on break time. Claimant further urged that it was difficult 
to get into and out of the employer's parking lot as other employees converged 
upon a narrow alleyway entering or departing the employer's parking lot. Claimant 
Freeman was injured when a co-worker, also seeking street parking, backed into 
her as she was getting out of her car. Under those facts, the Commission 
determined that claimant's decision to park on the public thoroughfare and not in 
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the employer provided parking lot did not fulfill any work related need or 
requirement of her employer. Thereupon, the Commission found that claimant 
Freeman's accident and injury did not arise out of and in the course of her 
employment. In affirming the Commission on appeal, this Court held that the 
Commission's decision was supported by substantial, competent evidence and 
awarded costs against appellant .Jsj_. at 39, 13 P.3d at 870. Respondents believe 
that, given the striking parallel in the fact patterns, the Court's decision in Freeman 
informs the result here and that the result here ought be the same as in Freeman. 
Appellant's reliance upon Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 
P.2d 404 (1946) to argue for a different result here is misplaced. In Smith, this 
Court considered application of the personal comfort doctrine in the context of a 
girl's dormitory ."housemother" who suffered injury (and, subsequently, death) 
resulting from a fall on a downtown Moscow sidewalk, off campus, while shopping 
for coffee and Christmas ornaments. There, the Court found that: 
When Mrs. Smith purchased the coffee and Christmas tree 
ornaments she did so for the mutual benefit of herself and her 
employer. She was at liberty and expected to use her own devices 
and discretion, in fact, at liberty to use any method advisable by her 
for the purpose of creating a congenial and homelike atmosphere 
among the group of girls living at the hall; to win their respect and 
retain their confidence; to adjust difficulties that might arise among 
them, and to supervise their conduct and activities, as well as their 
social affairs. Upon such occasions she served refreshments, all 
of which was incidental or ancillary to her employment and 
beneficial to her employer. Her superiors recognized the 
mutual benefit to Mrs. Smith and the University in carrying out 
the policy adopted by her. 
Id. at 29, 170 P.2d at 408-9 (emphasis added). 
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The instant matter is readily distinguishable from Smith in that, here, the 
Commission found that there was no "mutual benefit" rendering Claimant's drive 
up or trek down the slick country road incidental or ancillary to her employment 
Rather, the Commission found that: 
While it may have been for Claimant's own personal comfort, there 
was no nexus between satisfying that personal comfort and her 
employment. She was not engaged, either directly or indirectly, 
with the duties required of her job at the time she allegedly slipped 
and fell. While certain personal comfort activities may be 
reasonably anticipated in the normal course of human affairs during 
a workday such as restroom breaks, eating lunch, etc., Claimant's 
act of moving her car off Employer's premises to the turnout could 
not have been. The moving of Claimant's vehicles was more than 
a minor or inconsequential departure from her employment. 
Commission's Findings of Fact, etc. at ,i 10. 
Further, even the language quoted from Smith by Claimant at page 5 of 
her Brief operates against her. Specifically, the Court, in Smith, reminded that 
"Nor is (Claimant's] service [to her employer] interrupted when for a brief interval 
the worker performs a personal errand not forbidden." However, here, 
Claimant's departure from the employer's premises upon her own errand, without 
first seeking supervisory approval and clocking out, was forbidden; and Claimant 
was, in fact, reprimanded for that failure. Ex. G, 147; Tr. 44: 4-8. 
CONCLUSION 
Claimant does not argue that the Commission misapplied the law in this 
case but, rather, simply seeks a determination from this Court substituting 
Claimant's determination of pivotal facts for those found by the Commission 
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below. Further, Claimant puts forth no argument that the Commission failed to 
ground its decision upon substantial and competent evidence, rather, Claimant 
simply seeks to have this Court re-try the underlying case and re-weigh the 
evidence, hoping that the Court reaches factual findings which differ from those 
recorded by the Commission. 
Thereupon, Respondents respectfully pray this Court, applying the 
standard of review reiterated in Kessler, supra, affirm, as it did in Freeman, 
supra, the Commission's decision in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of July, 2008. 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, 
WHITTIER & DAY 
~~ E. scoHarmon
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
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